Executive Stock Option Exercises and Inside Information by Carpenter, Jennifer N. & Remmers, Barbara
Executive Stock Option Exercises and
Inside Information
Jennifer N. Carpenter and Barbara Remmers¤
November 28, 2000
¤Department of Finance, Stern School of Business, New York University, 44 West Fourth
Street, New York, NY, 10012, (212)-998-0352 and (212) 998-0365. We thank Yakov Ami-
hud, Brad Barber, Menachem Brenner, Stephen Brown, Philip Dybvig, Edwin Elton, Bruce
Grundy, Kose John, Steven Figlewski, Michael Lemmon, Anthony Lynch, Kevin Murphy,
Eli Ofek, Matthew Richardson, Nejat Seyhun, Robert Stambaugh, David Yermack, and an
anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. We also acknowledge valuable re-
search assistance from Viral Acharya. Please direct correspondence to Jennifer Carpenter
(fax: (212) 995-4233, email: jcarpen0@stern.nyu.edu).
Executive Stock Option Exercises and
Inside Information
Abstract
This paper examines whether corporate insiders use private information to time the exercises
of their executive stock options. Prior to May 1991, insiders had to hold the stock they
acquired through option exercise for six months. We ¯nd that exercises from this regulatory
regime precede signi¯cantly positive abnormal stock returns. This suggests that insiders
timed exercises so that the subsequent forced investment in the stock coincided with favorable
price performance. By contrast, we ¯nd little evidence of the use of inside information to
time exercises since the removal of the holding restriction in May 1991. When insiders can
sell the acquired shares immediately, the use of private information should manifest itself as
negative abnormal stock price performance following option exercise. However, only in the
subsample of exercises by top managers at small ¯rms, a tiny fraction of the full sample,
do we ¯nd signi¯cantly negative post-exercise stock price performance after May 1991. We
conclude that, in most cases, insiders' potential information advantage in timing exercises is
not an important issue in valuing executive stock options.
1 Introduction
The debate about the value of executive stock options has focused on features of these
options that make them worth less than ordinary options, such as their forfeitability
and nontransferability. However, other aspects of these options might enhance their
value to the executive. In particular, the executive might have private information
about the future price of the underlying stock.
This paper examines whether corporate insiders use private information to time the
exercises of their executive stock options.1 Our sample includes virtually all reported
insider exercises from 1984 to 1990 and from 1992 to 1995. Prior to May 1991, insiders
had to hold the stock they acquired through option exercise for six months.2 We
¯nd that exercises from this regulatory regime precede signi¯cantly positive abnormal
stock returns. This suggests that insiders timed exercises so that the subsequent forced
investment in the stock coincided with favorable price performance.
By contrast, we ¯nd little evidence of the use of inside information to time exercises
since the removal of the holding restriction in May 1991. When insiders are free to sell
the acquired shares immediately, the use of private information should manifest itself
as negative abnormal stock price performance following option exercise. However, only
in the subsample of exercises by top managers at small ¯rms, a tiny fraction of the full
sample, do we ¯nd signi¯cantly negative post-exercise stock price performance. Other-
wise, we ¯nd no evidence of exercising on inside information in the current regulatory
regime.
1Section 16(a) of the Securities Exchange Act de¯nes corporate insiders as o±cers, directors, and
bene¯cial owners of more than 10% of equity.
2In May 1991, the SEC changed the starting date of Section 16(b)'s six-month \short swing" holding
period from the exercise date to the grant date of the option. This change e®ectively eliminated the
holding period restriction on shares acquired through exercise, because most option plans already
require more than six months between grant and exercise. The SEC also changed the reporting
deadline from ten days after the month of the exercise to the sooner of the deadline for the next stock
transaction ¯ling or 45 days after the end of the ¯scal year of the exercise.
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Using data from 1993 to 1995, Ofek and Yermack (2000) ¯nd that the typical man-
ager sells virtually all shares acquired through option exercise. However, this by itself
is not evidence that insiders exercise options because of private negative information
about ¯rm prospects. Exercising and selling could simply re°ect diversi¯cation or liq-
uidity needs. Detecting the use of private information to time exercises requires an
examination of post-exercise stock price performance.
We test for the presence of abnormal stock price performance following insider
option exercises using the sample of all exercises from January 1984 to November 1995
that were reported to the SEC by December 1995. The removal of the six-month
holding restriction in May 1991 changes the theoretical impact of private information
on exercise decisions. Therefore, we separate exercises into two subsamples associated
with the di®erent regulatory regimes, those from January 1984 to December 1990, and
those from January 1992 to November 1995.
The sample is dominated by large and medium-sized ¯rms, where seasoned option
plans are most prevalent. In addition, option exercises tend to take place after large
stock price increases. For these reasons, we adjust post-exercise stock returns for both
size and momentum before drawing inferences about the use of inside information.
We begin by de¯ning an event at a given ¯rm as a month with any insider exercise.
In the pre-1991 subperiod, when the six-month holding period was in e®ect, abnormal
returns in the ¯rst six months after an exercise month average a signi¯cant 24 basis
points per month. However, in the post-1991 subperiod, abnormal returns after insider
option exercises are insigni¯cant.
Then we construct subsamples of exercises based on ¯rm size and insider position.
We also restrict the sample to include only non-dividend-related exercises or months
with a large number of di®erent insiders exercising. In general, the subsample results
vary in the direction anticipated. For example, exercises at smaller ¯rms and among
higher-ranked insiders seem slightly better timed, that is, they precede higher returns
in the pre-1991 subperiod and lower returns post-1991. However, for the most part,
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the results remain qualitatively the same as the full sample: post-exercise abnormal
returns are positive in the pre-1991 subperiod and insigni¯cant post-1991. Only when
we restrict the sample to top managers at small ¯rms do we ¯nd signi¯cantly negative
abnormal returns in the post-1991 regulatory regime.
We give two reasons for the general non-informativeness of insider exercises in the
post-1991 regulatory regime. First, the sample consists almost entirely of large and
medium-sized ¯rms, where insiders' informational advantages are likely to be weakest.
Indeed, studies of ordinary insider purchases and sales, such as Seyhun (1986, 1998)
and Lakonishok and Lee (1999), ¯nd trades at larger ¯rms to be less informative than
trades at smaller ¯rms.
Second, now that insiders can sell the acquired shares immediately, option exercises
are like sales in that they are transactions that allow insiders to reduce their exposure
to their ¯rms' stock. Given insiders' tendency to accumulate stock and options through
compensation, insider sales and exercises may be driven mainly by diversi¯cation or
liquidity needs. Recent evidence on sales supports this idea. Seyhun (1998) ¯nds that
sales are less informative than purchases and that the pro¯tability of sales declined
in the 1990s. Lakonishok and Lee (1999) and Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2000)
¯nd that insider sales are generally not informative at all. Our results suggest that,
like sales, option exercises in the current regulatory regime take place primarily for
noninformational reasons. We conclude that, except in the case of top managers at
small ¯rms, insiders' potential information advantage in timing exercises is not an
important issue in valuing executive stock options.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews literature on stock price perfor-
mance surrounding insider transactions. Section 3 examines the theoretical impact
of private information on exercise decisions. Section 4 describes the data and Sec-
tion 5 describes the methodology. Section 6 presents the empirical results. Section 7
concludes.
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2 Previous research
Most studies of stock price performance surrounding insider transactions focus on or-
dinary purchases and sales of stock. Studies such as Lorie and Niederho®er (1968),
Ja®e (1974), and Seyhun (1986, 1992, 1998) ¯nd positive abnormal performance after
purchases and negative abnormal performance after sales. In addition, Seyhun (1986,
1998) ¯nds that insider trades are more pro¯table the smaller the ¯rm and the closer
the insider to top management. More recently, Lakonishok and Lee (1999) and Jeng,
Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2000), who control for size and book-to-market e®ects in
measuring abnormal performance, ¯nd that insider sales are generally not informative.
Lakonishok and Lee (1999) also ¯nd that although insider trades at small ¯rms are
informative, insider trades at large ¯rms are not.
A few studies of insider trading examine stock price performance surrounding
option-related transactions. Seyhun (1998) ¯nds that after insider exercises of call
options, returns net of the equal-weighted market portfolio are slightly positive dur-
ing the period 1975 to 1994 but slightly negative if the sample is restricted to top
executive exercises after May 1991. Seyhun (1998) also ¯nds that net stock returns
following insider put exercises are signi¯cantly positive. Huddart and Lang (1996) ¯nd
that the fraction of options from a given grant that are exercised in a given month is
positively related to prior stock price performance and unrelated to subsequent stock
price performance. Yermack (1997) studies option grants and concludes that boards
of directors, possibly under in°uence from CEOs, time grants to top managers so that
they precede positive stock price performance.
3 The impact of information on exercise decisions
Since May 1991, insiders exercising executive stock options have been free to sell the
acquired stock immediately. The main purpose of this section is to establish that in
this regime the use of inside information to time exercises should show up empirically
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as negative post-exercise abnormal returns. In particular, we wish to refute a tax-based
argument to the contrary.
A call option represents a long position in the underlying stock. If the option holder
receives bad news about the future stock price, he may wish to reduce this position. If
the option is nontransferable, then exercising the option and selling the acquired stock
is the only way to reduce the position. Therefore, private negative information can
trigger an exercise.
Some argue on the other hand that if the executive expects the stock price to rise
over the coming year, he should exercise and hold the stock, because income from the
option payo® is taxed at a higher rate than capital gains on stock holdings. We show
that this tax-based argument for exercising prior to positive stock performance is not
valid. In particular, if the executive expects the stock price to rise su±ciently, he is
better o® holding the option and buying additional stock with the money that he would
otherwise have to pay to exercise the option, namely, the strike price and the tax on
the existing option pro¯t. More precisely, in the Appendix, we prove the following:
Proposition Suppose an executive holding an in-the-money nontransferable option
knows the future one-year stock return with certainty. Suppose the executive can exer-
cise the option today or in one year and can also invest in stock and bonds. Finally,
suppose the executive chooses an exercise and investment policy to maximize his end-
of-year payo®. Then there exists a critical value such that, if his stock price forecast is
above the critical value, the executive holds the option, and if his forecast is below the
critical value, he exercises the option.
The critical value of the stock price forecast, at which the optimal exercise decision
changes, depends on the strike price, the interest rate, the dividend rate, and the tax
rates. Nevertheless, for any con¯guration of these parameters, as the future stock price
forecast ranges from favorable to unfavorable, the optimal exercise decision switches
from holding the option to exercising it. A model of the executive's optimal exercise
5
policy with a binomial stock price, available from the authors, delivers the same basic
result. The essential implications of the models are:
1. Private bad news about the future stock return may or may not trigger an exercise
of a nontransferable option. Small downward revisions in the executive's stock
price forecast may not push him into the exercise region, but large ones will.
2. Private good news cannot trigger an exercise. Upward revisions in the executive's
forecast can only move him farther from the exercise region.
Statistical tests of insider trading examine abnormal returns, not total returns. Al-
though the models described above do not distinguish between abnormal and total
returns, because they do not incorporate multiple risky assets, they still illustrate the
essential information e®ect: private information can trigger an option exercise only if
it reduces the insider's desired exposure to the stock. Since an insider's private infor-
mation is typically speci¯c to his ¯rm, it tends to be information about the stock's
abnormal return. Furthermore, portfolio theory indicates that it is news about abnor-
mal return that changes desired holdings. Therefore, the use of inside information to
time exercises should show up as negative post-exercise abnormal returns.
Of course, exercises can also take place for reasons unrelated to private informa-
tion. Insiders' natural long position in their ¯rms through stock-based compensation
and human capital should precipitate option exercises and stock sales purely to meet di-
versi¯cation and liquidity needs. Noninformational events such as dividend payments,
employment termination, and option expiration can also trigger exercises. Therefore,
the average information content of insider option exercises is an empirical question.
Information and exercises prior to May 1991
Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to hold the stock acquired through
exercise for six months. In the presence of this holding restriction, the impact of new
information on exercise decisions is not obvious. News suggesting that the stock price
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is entering into a long slow decline might cause the holder of a deep-in-the-money
option to exercise in order to get through the holding period and still capture some
of the option pro¯t. On the other hand, good news about the future stock return
might make an option holder exercise because it makes him more willing to endure
the holding period. This latter information e®ect would generate positive post-exercise
stock performance.
4 Data
The data set consists of all option exercises by corporate insiders that took place
after January 1, 1984 and were reported to the SEC by December 19, 1995. The
source of the data is CDA/Investnet. After the removal of duplicate or incomplete
¯lings, there remain 201,003 exercises across 7,560 di®erent ¯rms. We focus on option
exercises from two subperiods, before and after the SEC lifted the six-month holding
restriction on stock acquired through option exercise. The ¯rst subsample contains
exercises from January 1984 through December 1990; the second contains exercises
from January 1992 through November 1995. We exclude exercises in 1991 to eliminate
any temporary e®ects of the regime change and to obtain statistical independence of
results in di®erent regimes.
Our data do not indicate whether the shares acquired through option exercise were
held or sold. However, this is not likely to be a problem because Ofek and Yermack
(2000) ¯nd that in this regime, almost all executives sell the shares acquired through
option exercise. In addition, we are unable to eliminate exercises triggered by option
expiration because expiration dates are not publicly available in electronic form. Again,
however, we do not believe this is a problem. Using proprietary data on option exercises
from 1985 to 1995, Huddart and Lang (1996) ¯nd that most exercises occur well before
expiration.
Figures 1a and 1b plot the number of ¯rms with insider exercises in each month
7
of the ¯rst and second subperiods, respectively. The ¯gures show that exercise l¯ings
are more frequent during the post-1991 regime. This may be because compliance with
SEC rules has improved with the new regulation, because option grants have increased
over time, or because strong stock market performance put more options in the money.
Another possibility is that the holding restriction of the ¯rst regime lead more insiders
to exercise tandem stock appreciation rights and get the option payo® in cash rather
than exercise options outright.
At the monthly level, Figures 1a and 1b show that year-end months tend to be peak
exercise times, probably for tax-timing reasons. December 1992 has the greatest num-
ber of exercises, re°ecting attempts to recognize option income before the tax increase
of 1993. In recent years, a quarterly pattern emerges with peaks in February, May, Au-
gust, and November. This may be associated with the growth in corporate restrictions
that limit insider trading to windows of time after quarterly earnings announcements
(see Jeng (1998) and Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000)).
Figures 1a and 1b also show the size composition of the sample ¯rms. \Small"
¯rms are those in the bottom three CRSP size deciles, \medium" ¯rms are those in the
middle four size deciles, and \large" ¯rms are those in the top three size deciles. The
¯gures show that the sample is heavily weighted towards large and medium-sized ¯rms.
In an average month, 67% of the ¯rms with insider exercises are large, while only 6%
are small. The scarcity of small ¯rms in our sample is consistent with insider trading
patterns documented elsewhere. Lakonishok and Lee (1999) ¯nd that, although the
frequency of ordinary insider purchases is fairly similar across ¯rms of di®erent size,
insider sales and option exercises are much more frequent at larger ¯rms. Seyhun
(1998) also ¯nds that sell months are more frequent at larger ¯rms. This seems to be
because seasoned option compensation plans, which precipitate exercises and sales, are
more prevalent at larger ¯rms during this time period.
8
5 Methodology
To address the question of whether insiders use private information to time their option
exercises, we test for the presence of abnormal post-exercise stock price performance.
In each subperiod, pre-1991 and post-1991, we examine stock price performance over
periods ranging from one day to one year after the exercise. We also ask whether the
removal of the holding restriction on acquired stock altered insiders' exercise strategies
by testing for a di®erence in post-exercise stock price performance across the two
regulatory regimes.
5.1 Measuring abnormal performance
We measure a ¯rm's abnormal return as the deviation of its return from the return on a
benchmark portfolio of ¯rms with similar characteristics. Our sample ¯rms are unusual
in two respects. First, they are almost all large and medium-sized ¯rms. Second, as
we document in Section 6, they experience signi¯cant stock price increases prior to the
event. We control for both of these characteristics.3
We begin by presenting returns adjusted for ¯rm size only, using the CRSP size
decile portfolios as benchmarks. Adjusting returns for size is widely used as a method
for measuring abnormal performance (see, for example, Desai and Jain (1995), Loughran
and Ritter (1995), or Michaely and Womack (1996)). The approach is founded on con-
siderable evidence that ¯rm size is important in explaining cross-sectional di®erences
in expected stock returns (see, for example, Fama and French (1992)) and has formal
theoretical justi¯cation as well (see Berk (1995)).
3We also examine the alphas in monthly calendar time series regressions of event portfolio excess
returns on the Fama and French (1993) market, size, and book-to-market factors (we thank Ken
French for these data). The event portfolio is rebalanced monthly to hold all ¯rms that have had an
insider exercise during a speci¯ed period of time relative to the rebalancing date. For virtually every
post-event period speci¯ed, the signi¯cance of the portfolio's estimated three-factor alpha is the same
as that of its mean size-adjusted return.
However, before we draw inferences about the use of inside information to time
exercises, we also control for ¯rms' extraordinary pre-exercise stock price performance.
Several papers ¯nd a \momentum" e®ect in stock returns in the time period of this
study (see, for example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Fama and French (1996), and
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)): over short horizons, stocks that have done
well in the past outperform stocks that have done poorly. Lyon, Barber, and Tsai
(1999) ¯nd that in random samples of ¯rms with good pre-event returns, tests for ab-
normal performance that do not control for momentum over-reject the null hypothesis
of no abnormal post-event performance in favor of positive performance. Therefore,
we base our conclusions on size-momentum-adjusted returns using a set of ¯fty bench-
mark portfolios of stocks in di®erent size deciles and momentum quintiles. Following
Carhart (1997), we de¯ne momentum for a ¯rm in month t as its compound return
over months t-12 through t-2.
5.2 Assessing signi¯cance
Option exercises are frequent events, so post-event periods overlap in calendar time.
Therefore, a cross-sectional t-statistic that treats the post-event abnormal returns as
independent is inappropriate. Instead, we assess statistical signi¯cance using the cal-
endar time portfolio method recommended by Lyon, Barber, and Tsai (1999). Ja®e
(1974), Mandelker (1974), and more recently, Loughran and Ritter (1995), Brav and
Gompers (1997), and Mitchell and Sta®ord (1997) all use variations of this approach.
For any given event period of interest, we create a calendar time series of the average
abnormal return on a portfolio of the ¯rms that are in the speci¯ed event period. For
example, if the period of interest is months 1 through 6 of event time, then each
calendar month, the event portfolio contains all ¯rms with an option exercise in the
preceding six calendar months. From this calendar time series, we compute the mean
abnormal return, its standard error, and a t-statistic.4
4One concern with this approach is the possibility that, because the number of ¯rms in the event
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6 Results
We begin by analyzing abnormal performance surrounding exercise events using the full
sample of option exercises in Section 6.1. Then we examine post-exercise performance
for various subsamples in Section 6.2. Section 6.3 discusses the results.
6.1 Results for the full sample
We present returns adjusted for size in Section 6.1.1 and for both size and momentum
in Section 6.1.2. Each section starts by examining stock performance over long event
periods, with an event at a given ¯rm de¯ned as a month with at least one insider
exercise. Then we look at performance in the days immediately surrounding exercises,
de¯ning an event as a day with an insider exercise.
6.1.1 Returns adjusted for size
Table 1 and Figure 2 describe stock price performance over the years surrounding
the exercise month. For each of the two regulatory regimes, Table 1 reports mean
monthly size-adjusted returns and t-statistics for months ¡12 to 12. Figure 2 plots the
cumulative average monthly size-adjusted return from month ¡120 to 12.
Prior to option exercises, stock prices rise dramatically. Size-adjusted returns in the
year before an exercise month average 1% per month during the pre-1991 subperiod and
1.6% per month during the post-1991 subperiod. The t-statistics for each of months
¡12 to ¡1 range from 7.58 to 15.62. Table 1 also shows the t-statistics for di®erences
portfolio changes over time, the portfolio abnormal returns are heteroskedastic. To address this
concern, we regress the squared residuals on the number of ¯rms in the event portfolio, a diagnostic
used by Mitchell and Sta®ord (1997), and on the inverse of the number of ¯rms in the event portfolio.
In the monthly time series for the full sample and for most of the subsamples, we ¯nd no relation.
In the remaining cases, we do ¯nd that residuals of smaller portfolios have higher variance, but when
we correct for this by reweighting the abnormal returns based on their estimated variance, the results
are virtually the same.
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in regime means. The pre-exercise abnormal returns are signi¯cantly higher in the
post-1991 regime than in the pre-1991 regime.
That exercises tend to take place after strong stock price performance is not surpris-
ing. It is consistent with insiders following an exercise policy that calls for exercising
once the stock price rises su±ciently high and does not provide any evidence regard-
ing the use of private information. Testing for private information trading involves
examining stock price performance after the option exercise.
After option exercise, size-adjusted stock returns diminish substantially, but remain
positive. In the pre-1991 subperiod, when the six-month holding restriction on acquired
shares was in e®ect, the mean monthly abnormal return for event months 1 through 6
is 35 basis points with a t-statistic of 3.39. In months 7 through 12, after the holding
period expires, the mean abnormal return falls to 18 basis points per month, with a
t-statistic of 1.73. In the post-1991 subperiod, which has no holding restriction, mean
size-adjusted returns after exercises are positive but smaller. Only in month 1 is the
mean abnormal return signi¯cant, 31 basis points with a t-statistic of 2.18.
Table 2 and Figure 3 describe stock price performance over the trading 40 days
surrounding the exercise day. The daily stock return pattern is similar to the monthly:
a striking run-up prior to exercise, especially in the second regime, that °attens out
after exercise. Prior to the exercise, the average daily abnormal stock return reaches 13
basis points on day -1 in the pre-1991 subperiod, and 30 basis points on day -1 in the
post-1991 subperiod. Again, pre-exercise abnormal returns in the post-1991 subperiod
are signi¯cantly higher than in the pre-1991 subperiod. After the option exercise, size-
adjusted returns remain signi¯cantly positive, an average of 4 basis points per day in
the twenty days after the exercise day.
6.1.2 Returns adjusted for size and momentum
With such strong pre-exercise stock price performance, controlling for a momentum
e®ect in post-exercise performance is imperative. The control is especially important
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for the post-1991 subperiod where the pre-exercise performance is stronger. Table 3
presents monthly returns adjusted for both size and momentum in the year after an
exercise month. Table 4 presents daily size-momentum-adjusted returns in the 20 days
after an exercise day.
Controlling for momentum generally reduces the magnitudes of the abnormal re-
turns, but in the pre-1991 regulatory regime they remain signi¯cantly positive. For
example, in the pre-1991 subperiod, the average abnormal return in months 1 to 6 falls
from 35 to 24 basis points per month but is still signi¯cant with a t-statistic of 2.88.
The average abnormal return in days 1 to 20 falls from 4 to 2 basis points per day but
is still signi¯cant with a t-statistic of 5.14.
In the post-1991 regulatory regime, however, controlling for momentum removes
virtually all positive abnormal performance of ¯rms after an option exercise. Using
the size-momentum benchmarks reduces the mean month 1 abnormal return in the
post-1991 subperiod from 31 to 13 basis points and the corresponding t-statistic from
2.18 to 1.21. The mean daily return for days 1 to 20 falls from 4 to 1 basis point per
day and its t-statistic falls from 4.64 to 1.01.
6.2 Results for various subsamples
The full sample results suggest that in the pre-1991 regulatory regime, insiders used
private information to time option exercises so that the resulting six-month investment
in the underlying shares coincided with a period of favorable stock price performance.
However, the post-1991 results for the full sample provide no evidence that insiders use
private information to exercise in advance of poor stock price performance now that
they are free to sell the underlying shares immediately. To investigate this ¯nding, this
section studies subsamples designed to isolate option exercises most likely to re°ect the
use of private information. First we examine subsamples of exercises grouped by ¯rm
size or insider position. Then we restrict the sample to non-dividend-related exercises.
Finally, we look at ¯rm months with widespread exercising. The remainder of this
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section describes each subsample and Table 5 contains the main results.
6.2.1 Subsamples based on ¯rm size
Insider trading may be more pro¯table at smaller ¯rms where the information asym-
metry between insiders and outsiders may be greater and where a given piece of infor-
mation may have greater impact on the market value of the ¯rm as a whole. Studies
of ordinary insider stock purchases and sales, such as Seyhun (1986, 1998) and Lakon-
ishok and Lee (1999), ¯nd that insider trading is more informative at smaller ¯rms.
Rows 2, 3, and 4 of Table 5 present average monthly size-momentum-adjusted returns
in the six months following an insider exercise for small, medium-sized, and large ¯rms,
respectively. The results vary with ¯rm size in the direction anticipated: smaller ¯rms
have higher post-exercise abnormal returns than larger ¯rms in the pre-1991 regulatory
regime and lower post-exercise returns in the post-1991 regime. However, the results
are qualitatively the same as in the full sample. Abnormal returns are signi¯cantly
positive in the old regime and insigni¯cant in the new.
6.2.2 Subsamples based on insider position
Higher-ranked insiders might have better information about the prospects of the ¯rm.
For instance, Seyhun (1998) ¯nds that ordinary stock sales and purchases by top ex-
ecutives are more pro¯table than those of other insiders. Rows 5, 6, 7, and 8 of Table
5 present post-exercise abnormal returns for four classes of insiders: top managers,
de¯ned as ¯rm presidents and board chairmen, o±cers, directors who are not also of-
¯cers, and large shareholders who are not also o±cers or directors. Again, the results
vary with insider position in the way we might expect: exercises by higher-ranked in-
siders precede higher abnormal returns in the pre-1991 subperiod and lower abnormal
returns in the post-1991 subperiod. Unlike the pre-1991 results for the full sample,
the pre-1991 post-exercise abnormal returns for large shareholders are insigni¯cantly
di®erent from zero. Otherwise, however, the results remain qualitatively the same as
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those for the full sample. In particular, even top manager exercises do not precede
signi¯cantly negative abnormal returns in the post-1991 subperiod.
6.2.3 Exercises by top managers at small ¯rms
Next, we examine size-momentum-adjusted returns in the six months following an
insider exercise for all twelve ¯rm size-insider position subsamples. For all but one
subsample, the abnormal returns in the post-1991 regime are insigni¯cant. In the
small ¯rm-top manager subsample, however, the results are dramatic. This is exactly
where we would expect to see the largest post-exercise abnormal returns, because this is
where insiders' information advantage is likely to be greatest, and the evidence con¯rms
this prediction. As row 9 of Table 5 shows, in the six months after these exercises,
mean abnormal returns are 120 basis points per month during the pre-1991 subperiod
and -87 basis points during the post-1991 subperiod. The negative mean abnormal
return in the post-1991 subperiod is signi¯cant, with a t-statistic of -2.45.
6.2.4 Non-dividend-related exercises
One noninformational reason to exercise an option early is to capture the value of a
dividend. We de¯ne non-dividend-related exercises as those which do not fall between
a dividend announcement date and an ex-dividend date. Row 10 of Table 5 describes
abnormal returns following months with at least one non-dividend-related exercise.
The results are virtually the same as those for the full sample. We also ¯nd that
restricting the ¯rm size-insider position subsamples to non-dividend related exercises
has little e®ect.
6.2.5 Months with many insiders exercising
Private information about ¯rm prospects could be a reason for widespread exercising,
as opposed reasons such as liquidity needs which might be independent across di®erent
executives. This subsample includes only ¯rm months in which the number of di®erent
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insiders exercising is unusually high. Di®erent ¯rms have di®erent numbers of insiders
and option programs of varying depths. In identifying a month with intense activity
at a given ¯rm we wish to take into account the normal level for that ¯rm as well as
seasonal patterns in the data. We use a simple approach. We ¯rst eliminate December
and January exercises, many of which may be motivated by tax timing. For each
remaining month, we compare the number of di®erent insiders exercising to the average
number of insiders exercising in each of the three previous months on the same quarterly
cycle. If the number of insiders exercising in a given month exceeds the past average,
that month is classi¯ed as having high activity, or widespread exercising. The results
for these high activity months appear in Row 11 of Table 5. Again, the restriction
makes a di®erence in the direction anticipated, but the e®ect is slight. Post-exercise
excess returns in the second regime remain insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero.
6.3 Discussion
Requirements to hold stock for six months after option exercise appear to have lead in-
siders to time option exercises so that they preceded favorable stock price performance.
In the pre-1991 subperiod, size-momentum-adjusted returns over the six months after
exercise are signi¯cantly positive for the full sample and most of the subsamples. They
are also greater than the corresponding post-1991 returns at marginal signi¯cance lev-
els in the full sample and at conventional signi¯cance levels in the small-¯rm and
higher-ranked-insider subsamples.
The results do not however indicate a pervasive use of inside information to time
exercises now that insiders are free to sell acquired shares immediately. When imme-
diate stock sale is possible, call option exercises are like sales in the sense that they are
transactions that allow an insider to reduce his exposure to the ¯rm's stock return. For
this reason, the use of private information should manifest itself as negative abnormal
stock price performance after exercises. Yet only in the subsample of exercises by top
managers at small ¯rms, a tiny fraction of the full sample, are size-momentum-adjusted
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returns signi¯cantly negative in the post-1991 subperiod.
The general non-informativeness of exercises during the period 1992 to 1995 may
seem somewhat puzzling given that numerous studies ¯nd ordinary insider transactions
to be abnormally pro¯table. However, the result is not entirely surprising given the
striking size composition of the sample. The sample consists almost entirely of large
and medium-sized ¯rms where studies of ordinary purchases and sales ¯nd insider
trades to be the least informative.
The general absence of negative stock price performance following insider exercises
from the post-1991 subperiod is also consistent with recent evidence on insider sales. In-
siders accumulate large holdings of stock and call options through their compensation.
Therefore, option exercise and sales may be driven mainly by liquidity and portfolio
rebalancing needs unrelated to private information. Lakonishok and Lee (1999) and
Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser (2000) ¯nd that insider sales are generally not informa-
tive. Our evidence suggests that, like sales, option exercises take place primarily for
noninformational reasons. Only where the insider's information advantage is greatest
do we ¯nd evidence of trading on inside information.
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the information content of insider option exercises. Prior to May
1991, the SEC required insiders to hold acquired shares for six months after option
exercise. We ¯nd that exercises from 1984 to 1990 precede signi¯cantly positive ab-
normal returns. This suggests that when exercising an option entailed a mandatory
six month investment in the stock, insiders used private information to exercise before
good stock price performance.
In May 1991, the SEC removed the holding period restriction. We show that if the
executive can sell the acquired shares immediately after exercise, bad news can trigger
an option exercise but good news cannot, even when income tax rates exceed capital
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gains tax rates. This implies that after May 1991, the use of private information should
manifest itself as negative post-exercise abnormal performance.
Empirically, we ¯nd that during the period 1992 to 1995, abnormal returns after
exercises by top managers at small ¯rms are signi¯cantly negative. Otherwise, how-
ever, we ¯nd no evidence of the use of inside information to time option exercises. We
o®er two reasons for this general non-informativeness of insider exercises. First, the
sample consists almost entirely of large and medium-sized ¯rms, where insiders' infor-
mation advantages are the weakest. Second, now that insiders can sell the acquired
shares immediately, exercises are like sales, which appear to take place primarily for
diversi¯cation and liquidity purposes unrelated to private information.
Our results suggest that compensation committees at small ¯rms granting options
to top managers may wish to take into account the possibility that informational
advantages increase the value of the options to the managers. In most cases, however,
asymmetric information does not appear to be an important concern for the valuation
of executive stock options.
Appendix: Proof of proposition
Without loss of generality, assume that the current stock price is one and the executive
has just one option. Let
k = strike price of the options, 0 < k < 1;
¿i = income tax rate, 0 · ¿i < 1
¿c = capital gains tax rate, 0 · ¿c < 1
r^ = after-tax interest rate, r^ > 0
±^ = after-tax dividend rate, ±^ ¸ 0 and
1 + rs = future stock price:
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For example, if interest and dividends are taxable as income, then r^ = r(1 ¡ ¿i) and
±^ = ±(1 ¡ ¿i) where r and ± are the pre-tax interest rate and dividend rate.
If the executive exercises the option today, he gets (1¡ ¿i)(1¡ k) after taxes. If he
waits until the end of the year, he will get (1¡ ¿i)(1 + rs¡ k)+. The implied after-tax
rate of return from leaving the option alive, instead of exercising it, is
after-tax option return =
(1¡ ¿i)(1 + rs¡ k)+
(1¡ ¿i)(1 ¡ k)
¡ 1 (1)
= max(
rs
1¡ k;¡1) : (2)
Compare this to the after-tax returns of the stock and the bond. The after-tax bond
return is r^. The after-tax stock return is rs(1 ¡ ¿c) + ±^. We assume for expositional
purposes that the capital gains tax applies symmetrically to gains and losses. The
result is the same if the capital gains tax applies only to positive gains.
The executive chooses to exercise the option or not according to which action max-
imizes his future payo®. If the after-tax option return exceeds both the stock and bond
returns then leaving the option alive yields the greatest future payo®. If the return
on either the stock or the bond exceeds the option return, then the executive's best
strategy is to exercise the option and invest the after-tax pro¯t in the asset with the
greater return. The question of which return is greatest depends on the level of the
future stock price. It also depends on the values of the other parameters. Let
b1 ´ ±^(1¡ k)¿c(1¡ k) + k ; (3)
b2 ´ r^(1¡ k) ; (4)
b3 ´ r^ ¡ ±^
1¡ ¿c : (5)
If rs > b1, the option return exceeds the stock return. If rs > b2, the option return
exceeds the bond return. If rs > b3, the stock return exceeds the bond return. These
relations imply that the following exercise and investment policy is optimal:
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(i) Low dividend: If ±^ · r^(k(1¡ ¿c) + ¿c), then b1 · b2 · b3 and the optimal policy is
Exercise option & Invest in bonds if rs < b2 ; (6)
Leave option alive if rs ¸ b2 : (7)
(ii) High dividend: If ±^ > r^(k(1¡ ¿c) + ¿c), then b1 > b2 > b3 and the optimal policy is
Exercise option & Invest in bonds if rs < b3 ; (8)
Exercise option & Invest in stock if b3 · rs < b1 ; (9)
Leave option alive if rs ¸ b1 : (10)
In both con¯gurations of the parameters ±^; r^; k, and ¿c, the optimal exercise policy
involves exercising only when the anticipated stock price 1+ rs lies below some critical
level.
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TABLE 1 Monthly Size-Adjusted Returns Surrounding Insider Option Exercises
Calendar time series means and t-statistics for monthly size-adjusted returns on event portfolios. An
event at a ¯rm is a month in which at least one insider exercises an option. Each event portfolio is
rebalanced monthly to hold all ¯rms in the indicated event period. The table summarizes time series
from two di®erent regulatory regimes. Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to hold shares
acquired through exercise for six months. In May 1991, the SEC removed this restriction.
Jan 1984 to Dec 1990 Jan 1992 to Nov 1995 t-statistic for di®erence
Event period Mean (bp) t-statistic Mean (bp) t-statistic in regime means
Month -12 109 9.01 151 8.79 -2.03
Month -11 105 7.98 154 11.00 -2.53
Month -10 97 9.50 161 10.63 -3.53
Month -9 99 8.16 152 10.56 -2.82
Month -8 106 9.01 141 9.28 -1.80
Month -7 108 8.84 150 11.61 -2.37
Month -6 97 8.08 154 11.17 -3.09
Month -5 94 8.05 149 10.96 -3.08
Month -4 101 7.58 170 13.02 -3.74
Month -3 101 8.26 167 10.98 -3.41
Month -2 113 9.60 183 12.82 -3.81
Month -1 130 9.66 229 15.62 -5.00
Month 0 120 8.38 174 10.26 -2.43
Months 1 to 6 35 3.39 13 1.03 1.34
Months 7 to 12 18 1.73 17 1.40 0.06
Month 1 48 3.59 31 2.18 0.89
Month 2 42 3.58 0 0.02 2.10
Month 3 43 3.45 9 0.65 1.82
Month 4 34 2.51 10 0.77 1.24
Month 5 26 2.32 16 1.05 0.49
Month 6 28 2.57 27 1.99 0.07
Month 7 17 1.52 19 1.30 -0.09
Month 8 20 1.53 15 1.16 0.25
Month 9 20 1.85 20 1.55 -0.03
Month 10 7 0.57 10 0.77 -0.17
Month 11 24 1.92 10 0.67 0.74
Month 12 19 1.56 11 0.83 0.41
TABLE 2 Daily Size-Adjusted Returns Surrounding Insider Option Exercises
Calendar time series means and t-statistics for daily size-adjusted returns on event portfolios. Each
event portfolio is rebalanced daily to hold all ¯rms in the indicated event period. An event at a ¯rm
is a day on which at least one insider exercises an option. The table summarizes time series from two
di®erent regulatory regimes. Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to hold shares acquired
through exercise for six months. In May 1991, the SEC removed this restriction.
Jan 1984 to Dec 1990 Jan 1992 to Nov 1995 t-statistic for di®erence
Event period Mean (bp) t-statistic Mean (bp) t-statistic in regime means
Day -20 6 4.39 15 9.43 -4.25
Day -19 6 4.22 14 8.95 -4.20
Day -18 8 5.79 15 10.07 -3.53
Day -17 8 6.15 13 8.40 -2.22
Day -16 8 6.10 13 8.25 -2.56
Day -15 8 5.78 14 9.23 -2.98
Day -14 9 5.84 15 9.40 -2.88
Day -13 7 5.10 18 10.97 -5.32
Day -12 9 6.35 15 9.23 -2.79
Day -11 9 6.48 17 11.19 -3.82
Day -10 7 5.11 18 12.02 -5.44
Day -9 11 7.72 18 11.28 -3.46
Day -8 11 7.48 18 12.03 -3.68
Day -7 7 5.01 17 10.39 -4.73
Day -6 10 7.36 20 12.55 -4.74
Day -5 7 5.53 20 12.71 -6.39
Day -4 12 8.13 24 15.06 -5.74
Day -3 11 7.68 26 15.53 -6.66
Day -2 12 8.02 30 18.33 -8.59
Day -1 13 8.83 30 17.60 -7.24
Day 0 3 2.30 19 10.58 -6.79
TABLE 2 (Continued )
Jan 1984 to Dec 1990 Jan 1992 to Nov 1995 t-statistic for di®erence
Event period Mean (bp) t-statistic Mean (bp) t-statistic in regime means
Days 1 to 20 4 7.31 4 4.64 0.22
Days 1 to 5 5 6.96 5 5.75 0.00
Days 6 to 10 3 3.94 3 2.96 -0.09
Days 11 to 15 4 5.31 3 2.90 0.86
Days 16 to 20 2 2.90 3 3.60 -1.09
Day 1 9 5.99 11 6.69 -0.86
Day 2 5 3.32 5 3.11 0.14
Day 3 6 4.10 6 3.70 0.00
Day 4 4 2.75 2 1.48 0.62
Day 5 3 1.93 4 2.30 -0.49
Day 6 3 2.02 3 1.62 0.12
Day 7 4 2.71 2 1.54 0.69
Day 8 3 2.45 2 1.58 0.44
Day 9 1 0.58 3 1.94 -1.04
Day 10 3 1.96 2 1.45 0.19
Day 11 5 3.59 1 0.43 2.08
Day 12 3 2.12 5 3.24 -1.09
Day 13 4 2.41 3 2.12 0.13
Day 14 5 4.01 3 1.64 1.44
Day 15 2 1.43 3 1.84 -0.39
Day 16 3 2.01 3 1.90 0.00
Day 17 1 0.66 6 3.66 -2.39
Day 18 2 1.68 3 1.82 -0.28
Day 19 3 1.76 3 2.24 -0.42
Day 20 2 1.29 3 1.73 -0.37
TABLE 3 Monthly Size-Momentum-Adjusted Returns After Insider Option Exercises
Calendar time series means and t-statistics for monthly size-momentum-adjusted returns on event
portfolios. Each event portfolio is rebalanced monthly to hold all ¯rms in the indicated event period.
An event at a ¯rm is a month in which at least one insider exercises an option. The table summarizes
time series from two di®erent regulatory regimes. Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to
hold shares acquired through exercise for six months. In May 1991, the SEC removed this restriction.
Jan 1984 to Dec 1990 Jan 1992 to Nov 1995 t-statistic for di®erence
Event period Mean (bp) t-statistic Mean (bp) t-statistic in regime means
Months 1 to 6 24 2.88 3 0.33 1.63
Months 7 to 12 16 1.90 16 1.63 -0.02
Month 1 35 3.21 13 1.21 1.41
Month 2 27 2.79 -8 -0.61 2.17
Month 3 29 2.91 1 0.12 1.91
Month 4 23 2.10 -4 -0.36 1.81
Month 5 15 1.72 2 0.19 0.83
Month 6 20 2.12 18 1.72 0.17
Month 7 9 0.89 10 0.74 -0.06
Month 8 15 1.44 11 0.99 0.23
Month 9 19 2.10 19 1.80 0.02
Month 10 6 0.66 10 0.88 -0.23
Month 11 22 2.21 15 1.19 0.48
Month 12 22 2.20 18 1.59 0.25
TABLE 4 Daily Size-Momentum-Adjusted Returns After Insider Option Exercises
Calendar time series means and t-statistics for daily size-momentum-adjusted returns on event port-
folios. Each event portfolio is rebalanced daily to hold all ¯rms in the indicated event period. An
event at a ¯rm is a day on which at least one insider exercises an option. The table summarizes time
series from two di®erent regulatory regimes. Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to hold
shares acquired through exercise for six months. In May 1991, the SEC removed this restriction.
Jan 1984 to Dec 1990 Jan 1992 to Nov 1995 t-statistic for di®erence
Event period Mean (bp) t-statistic Mean (bp) t-statistic in regime means
Days 1 to 20 2 5.14 1 1.01 2.23
Days 1 to 5 4 5.23 3 2.97 1.17
Days 6 to 10 1 2.05 0 0.21 1.08
Days 11 to 15 3 3.79 0 -0.14 2.53
Days 16 to 20 1 1.69 1 0.83 0.41
Day 1 8 5.22 7 4.32 0.50
Day 2 4 2.74 2 1.38 0.91
Day 3 4 2.95 3 2.12 0.43
Day 4 2 1.33 -1 -0.67 1.37
Day 5 1 0.87 2 1.31 -0.42
Day 6 1 0.75 -2 -1.12 1.33
Day 7 2 1.53 0 0.23 0.86
Day 8 2 1.64 -1 -0.45 1.44
Day 9 -1 -0.38 1 0.71 -0.79
Day 10 1 0.71 0 0.12 0.39
Day 11 3 2.47 -2 -1.67 2.90
Day 12 2 1.23 3 1.80 -0.56
Day 13 2 1.70 -1 -0.51 1.56
Day 14 4 3.05 1 0.42 1.75
Day 15 2 1.09 0 -0.25 0.94
Day 16 2 1.15 0 -0.17 0.92
Day 17 1 0.93 2 1.48 -0.51
Day 18 1 0.64 0 0.23 0.25
Day 19 1 1.03 2 1.08 -0.07
Day 20 0 0.29 0 0.01 0.20
TABLE 5 Monthly Size-Momentum-Adjusted Returns in the Six Months After an
Insider Exercise for Various Subsamples
Calendar time series means and t-statistics for monthly size-momentum-adjusted returns on event
portfolios. Each event portfolio is rebalanced monthly to hold all ¯rms with an event in the preceding
six months. In the \Full sample," the event is a month with an insider exercise. The \Small ¯rms,"
\Medium-sized ¯rms," \Large ¯rms," \Top managers," \O±cers," \Directors," \Large shareholders,"
and \Top managers at small ¯rms" subsamples restrict the sample according to ¯rm size or insider
position. \Non-dividend-related" exercises are those that do not fall between a dividend announcement
date and an ex-dividend date. In the \Many insiders exercising" subsample, the event is a month in
which the number of insiders exercising exceeds the average of that in the previous three months on
the same quarterly cycle and which is neither a December nor January. The table summarizes time
series from two di®erent regulatory regimes. Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to hold
shares acquired through exercise for six months. In May 1991, the SEC removed this restriction.
Jan 1984 to Dec 1990 Jan 1992 to Nov 1995 t-statistic for di®erence
Subsample Mean (bp) t-statistic Mean (bp) t-statistic in regime means
Full sample 24 2.88 3 0.33 1.63
Small ¯rms 71 2.75 -1 -0.06 2.26
Medium-sized ¯rms 34 2.74 3 0.20 1.66
Large ¯rms 18 2.37 4 0.45 1.22
Top managers 31 3.05 -2 -0.16 2.15
O±cers 27 3.08 -1 -0.13 2.06
Directors 25 2.17 14 0.93 0.56
Large shareholders 1 0.08 19 1.34 -0.93
Top managers at small ¯rms 120 2.19 -87 -2.45 3.17
Non-dividend-related 23 2.40 2 0.21 1.32
Many insiders exercising 26 2.89 0 0.03 1.87
Fig. 1a. -- Number of firms with insider exercises, 1984-1990
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Fig. 1b. -- Number of firms with insider exercises, 1992-1995
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
Ja
n-
92
M
ar
-9
2
M
ay
-9
2
Ju
l-9
2
Se
p-
92
N
ov
-9
2
Ja
n-
93
M
ar
-9
3
M
ay
-9
3
Ju
l-9
3
Se
p-
93
N
ov
-9
3
Ja
n-
94
M
ar
-9
4
M
ay
-9
4
Ju
l-9
4
Se
p-
94
N
ov
-9
4
Ja
n-
95
M
ar
-9
5
M
ay
-9
5
Ju
l-9
5
Se
p-
95
N
ov
-9
5
Large firms
Medium firms
Small firms
Fig. 2. -- Mean cumulative monthly size-adjusted stock returns around insider option exercises from two 
regulatory regimes.  Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to hold acquired shares for six months.  
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Fig. 3. --  Mean cumulative daily size-adjusted stock returns around insider option exercises from two 
regulatory regimes.  Prior to May 1991, the SEC required insiders to hold acquired shares for six months.
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